American University Criminal Law Brief
Volume 6

Issue 2

Article 4

2010

Cellular Telephones and the Fourth Amendment
Jeffrey T. Wennar
American University Washington College of Law

Jamie Brinkmeyer Perry
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clb
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Wennar,Jeffrey T., and Jamie Brinkmeyer Perry." Cellular Telephones and the Fourth Amendment."
American University Criminal Law Brief 6, no. 2 (2010): 20-26.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American University Criminal Law Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Cellular Telephones and the Fourth Amendment
BY JEFFREY T. WENNAR AND JAMIE BRINKMEYER PERRY

C

ellular telephones (“cell phones”) provide their
users with immediate access and connectivity, and
this has become the expectation of the majority of
society. Cell phones allow users to communicate by
way of actual conversations, text messages, and email. As a result, most cell phones store a wealth of information: contact names, phone numbers
and addresses, recently called numbers,
emails, text messages, and photographs.
The majority of cell phone use is for a legal
purpose but unfortunately, cell phones are
also used in conjunction with criminal activity. This raises the question of whether
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is applicable to a cell phone seized
incident to an arrest. The inquiry also questions whether there is an acceptable period of time within which
law enforcement can examine a cell phone incident to an arrest
before a search warrant is required.

DISCUSSION
I. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CELL PHONES
INCIDENT TO ARRESTS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL, AS
LONG AS THEY ARE PURSUANT TO A VALID ARREST,
CONTEMPORANEOUS TO THAT ARREST, AND
REASONABLE IN SCOPE.

Warrantless searches of cell phones are generally constitutional pursuant to a valid exception to the warrant requirement,
which allows for searches incident to an arrest. Contemporaneous to a lawful arrest, law enforcement officers are permitted
to search call logs and text messages for evidence that could
potentially be destroyed before a search warrant is obtained.1
However, this search must be reasonable, and searches extending into further areas of the cell phone, such as pictures and Internet browsing history, may exceed the scope of this exception.
The Fourth Amendment provides constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires
that warrants, supported by probable cause, be issued prior
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to searching areas where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.2 Searches are generally unlawful if they
are performed without such warrants and if they violate the
owners’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the item or area
being searched.3 Evidence gained from an illegal search will
be suppressed.4 However, there are exceptions to this general warrant requirement.5
Even when a warrantless search violates
a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, it will be deemed constitutional if
it falls within an established exception to
the warrant requirement.6 One such exception refers to searches carried out incident
to lawful arrests.7 This exception is based
on the principle that a person lawfully arrested has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to property taken from
his person. Contemporaneous to arrest, the government has a
right to search the person of the accused to obtain evidence of
the crime.8 However, a search incident to arrest must still be
reasonable; meaning the need to search outweighs the invasion
of privacy imposed by the search.9
Over the last forty years, several Supreme Court decisions
have clarified the scope of this exception. In Chimel v. California,10 the Court explained that this exception applies to a search
incident to an arrest only when limited to a search for weapons or for evidence that could be concealed or destroyed.11 The
Court further restricted this search to the arrestee’s person and
the area within his immediate control.12 Yet shortly thereafter
the Court extended the scope of this rule, stating that officers
could search all items on an arrestee’s person, including closed
containers, without needing to articulate suspicion that the contents of the container are illegal.13 In 1981, the Court addressed
the search incident to arrest exception as it applies to automobiles, stating that it is lawful to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and containers therein when an occupant of
the car is lawfully arrested.14 The Court specifically noted that
the term “container” should be interpreted broadly to include
all objects capable of holding other objects.15 It is worth noting
the recent Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Gant which
clarifies and limits the Belton rule, although the Gant limitation
likely does not affect this analysis.16
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While the case law regarding searches incident to arrest
is generally well established, the Supreme Court has not yet
addressed issues related to warrantless searches of cell phones
incident to arrest. Maryland courts have yet to address the issue
as well. Although there is no binding authority in Maryland,
decisions from U.S. district and circuit courts from around the
country provide persuasive authority on this issue, including
two recent cases from the Fourth Circuit.17
Early cases examining searches incident to arrests with regard to technology focused on electronic pagers.18 Courts consistently held that retrieving the call history from a pager found
on the person of an arrestee did not violate that individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights.19 In United States v. Ortiz, the defendant was arrested for conspiracy to possess heroin, and an
electronic pager was found on his person.20 An agent on the
scene recovered phone numbers and written messages from the
pager.21 The court upheld the constitutionality of this search,
stating that due to the finite nature of a pager’s memory, incoming pages may erase currently saved messages.22 Due to
the possibility that such evidence may be destroyed, the court
stated that it was imperative that law enforcement officers have
the authority to immediately search and retrieve such information contemporaneous to an arrest.23 Similarly, the United States
District Court for the Virgin Islands held that numbers stored in
a pager on the arrestee’s person could be accessed and recorded
by law enforcement officers shortly after arrest, likening the
contents of pagers and cell phones to the contents of a wallet or
address book.24
Courts around the country have generally applied the logic
from pager and wallet cases to uphold warrantless searches of
cell phones incident to arrest. The most commonly cited case is
United States v. Finley.25 In Finley, the defendant was arrested
during a traffic stop immediately following a controlled buy
of methamphetamine.26 A cell phone was recovered from the
defendant’s shirt pocket and a special agent looked through the
call records and text messages, finding incriminating messages
tying the defendant to narcotics use and trafficking.27 The court
held that this search incident to arrest, including the search of
the defendant’s call records and text messages, was lawfully
done to preserve evidence. In making this assertion, the court
recognized that law enforcement officers on the scene have no
way of knowing whether messages will automatically delete
themselves as new messages are received.28 For example, software applications such as TigerText allows the sender to program when a message or picture will automatically be deleted
from the recipient’s phone.29 The court reiterated that a search
incident to arrest extends to containers found on the arrestee’s
person regardless of whether that container is open or closed,
and determined that a cell phone was an electronic container
subject to this warrant exception.30
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Numerous U.S. district court opinions have also upheld
searches of cell phone contents incident to arrest, often analogizing the search of a phone to the search of wallets, address
books, and other containers found on a person at the time of
arrest.31 Many of these courts discuss the dynamic nature of
cell phone and pager memory, stating that the contents of these
electronic containers are subject to change without warning,
thus creating a risk that data could be lost with every new call
or message received by a particular cell phone.32
Two cases out of the Fourth Circuit provide persuasive authority for jurisdictions where courts have not addressed this
issue. Both cases cite the need to preserve evidence as justification for the warrantless searches of cell phones incident to
arrest.33 In United States v. Young, the search of a defendant
arrested for drug trafficking yielded a cell phone, and an officer on the scene accessed text messages and recorded their
contents.34 The court upheld the search, noting that the officer
had no way of knowing if the messages would be preserved and
thus further analogizing the search of the cell phone to previous
cases upholding searches of electronic pagers.35 In United States
v. Murphy, the defendant’s cell phone was recovered from his
person at the time of arrest, and an officer on the scene found
incriminating text messages contained within.36 The court cited
Young, as well as older cases involving electronic pagers, to
justify the search incident to arrest based on a manifest need
to preserve evidence.37 The court further noted that it would be
unworkable and unreasonable to require officers to determine
the storage capacity of a phone before searching its contents.38
Two courts have departed from this logic by suppressing
evidence collected from cell phones during searches incident
to arrest. However, both of these courts primarily scrutinized
the timing of the searches, stating that they were not contemporaneous to the arrest.39 The Lasalle court ended its analysis
upon determining that the search was too remote in time and
place from the arrest, later declining to address the constitutionality of the search as if it had been conducted contemporaneously.40 Conversely, the Park court included a discussion
of warrantless searches of cell phones occurring closer in time
and place to the arrest.41 The court recognized that while a cell
phone is similar to a pager or address book, the similarities end
there.42 Modern cell phones often contain calendars, voice messages, emails, videos, pictures, and Internet browsing history.
The court in Park stated that the line between cell phones and
personal computers has grown increasingly blurry, holding that
because of the quantity and quality of information that can be
stored on modern cell phones, they garner a greater expectation of privacy.43 Therefore, the court determined a cell phone
should not be characterized as a container closely associated
with the person of the arrestee and should not be searched without a warrant.44

21

Other than Park, many courts have yet to address the
quickly changing technology of cell phones. With each passing month, cell phone companies release phones with newer
features, larger storage capacities, and greater Internet browsing capabilities. As technology improves, cell phones become less like
their pager ancestors and more like
laptop computers. It is likely that future decisions will begin to analogize
cell phones to computers, affording
them greater protections due to the increased expectation of privacy. Newer
phones, such as the Blackberry and
iPhone, are particularly able to store
large amounts of information—much
more than an arrestee could typically
carry on his person in a wallet, address
book, or pager. Thus an officer who is
conducting a search and comes across
this type of cell phone could easily access an arrestee’s Internet browsing
history, bank records, passwords, and
emails. It is unlikely that courts would
allow warrantless searches of this scope to continue, as one requirement of the search incident to arrest exception is that the
search itself is reasonable. Early decisions addressing warrantless searches of laptop computers have shown that courts are
unwilling to extend this exception to laptops found on the arrestee’s person, citing the vast amounts of personal and private
information stored on such devices.45
In United States v. Arnold, the defendant’s Blackberry personal digital assistant (“PDA”) was seized from his backpack
incident to his arrest and then searched.46 The court discussed
the technology of a PDA, stating that it contains both temporary
and permanent memory.47 Temporary memory includes applications such as the recent calls list, while the permanent memory
contains information that is only altered when changes are imputed by the user.48 Following this discussion the court declined
to decide the evidentiary issue, leaving unanswered questions
regarding searches of newer technologies such as Blackberries
and iPhones.49 Although the court did not rule on the constitutionality of the search, its analysis of new cell phone technology
may provide guidance for future law enforcement procedures
governing searches of cell phones incident to arrests.
The vast amount of case law on warrantless searches of cell
phones indicates that these types of searches, reasonably conducted contemporaneous to a lawful arrest, are constitutional.50
When a cell phone is found close to the arrestee’s person at
the time of arrest, or inside the passenger compartment of his
vehicle, officers should be permitted to conduct a reasonable
search of the cell phone. This search can include call logs and

text messages, so that officers might preserve possible evidence
that could be erased without warning. However, as new technology continues to improve and expand the capabilities of cell
phones, courts may begin to limit the use of the search incident to arrest exception as it applies to
such technology. Accordingly, officers
should recognize that the scope of this
type of search should be limited to call
logs and text messages, as these are
the areas of the phone that are most
dynamic and subject to change without warning. The need to preserve
evidence provides the well established
justification for a reasonable search of
this nature. However, a search of other
capabilities of the phone, such as pictures, videos, and Internet browsing
history, should be conducted only with
a search warrant, as this type of evidence is afforded a higher expectation
of privacy, is unlikely to be destroyed,
and can be viewed at a later date or
time. Whenever possible, a warrant
should be obtained when an officer is unsure if a search will
extend beyond the scope permitted by the search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement.

It is likely that future

decisions will begin to
analogize cell phones

to computers, affording

them greater protections
due to the increased

expectation of privacy.
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II. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CELL PHONES
INCIDENT TO ARREST MUST BE CONTEMPORANEOUS TO
THE ARREST, MEANING THAT THEY ARE NOT REMOTE IN
TIME AND PLACE TO THE ARREST.

The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement allows law enforcement officers to conduct searches
contemporaneous to arrest either to recover weapons or to prevent possible destruction of evidence.51 Evidence obtained as
part of a search incident to an arrest will be suppressed if it is
not retrieved contemporaneous to that arrest.52 The term “contemporaneous” is commonly defined as “existing or occurring
during the same time.”53 Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor
courts in Maryland have defined a fixed outer limit regarding
how much time can elapse before a search is no longer contemporaneous to an arrest. Generally, a search will be considered
contemporaneous if it is completed as soon as reasonably possible, before the booking process is completed, and if it is not
remote in time and place. These factors all indicate reasonableness of a search, and Maryland courts have held that such an
analysis is not rigid and absolute; rather “each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances.”54
In Preston v. United States,55 the Supreme Court reiterated
that a contemporaneous search after a lawful arrest is permissible to search for weapons and to recover evidence of the crime
Spring 2011

before it can be destroyed.56 If such a search is so remote in time
and place that these two justifications are no longer a concern,
then the search is no longer considered contemporaneous and
is unconstitutional.57 It is unreasonable to conduct a warrantless search that does not fall under these justifications, and such
searches are not lawful.
Courts have typically allowed more time for searches of the
arrestee’s person and items closely associated with his person,
while limiting the time allowed to search other personal effects
such as luggage. In United States v. Edwards,58 the Supreme
Court held that searches of an arrestee’s person and articles immediately associated with that person, such as purses or backpacks, may occur either at the time of arrest or when the arrestee
arrives at the place of detention, but before booking procedures
are completed.59 Edwards was arrested around 11:00 p.m. and
taken to jail, where he remained in his own clothing until the
next morning because no substitute clothes were available at
the late hour of his arrival.60 The next morning, his clothing was
taken for laboratory analysis without a warrant.61 The Court held
that effects closely associated with his person at the time and
place of detention may be searched without a warrant, stating
that it would have been unreasonable to leave him with no clothing in order to effectuate the search.62 As this was not an undue
or unreasonable delay, the warrantless search was valid because
the officers completed it as soon as reasonably possible.63 The
need to preserve evidence was still present, so despite the delay
in time, the search was reasonable and met the requirements of
the search incident to arrest exception as defined by the court
in Preston. However, the Edwards decision does not extend to
other personal effects not closely associated with the person of
the arrestee, such as luggage.64
The decision in Edwards appears to be one of the more
liberal interpretations of the contemporaneous requirement.65
Maryland courts have not defined a bright line rule regarding
how much time can pass before a warrantless search is no longer
contemporaneous to arrest, but courts since Edwards have not
allowed significant periods of time to pass. Guidance from the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals indicates that if a search
closely anticipates, contemporaneously parallels, or shortly follows an arrest, then it satisfies the requirements of the search
incident to arrest requirement.66 Subsequent decisions in Maryland indicate that a search must simply be “essentially contemporaneous.”67 A search incident to arrest will not be considered
contemporaneous if there is any undue delay.68 Because there
is no fixed outer limit regarding time between an arrest and
a search incident to that arrest, courts must weigh the many
factors involved including time elapsed, change of location,
continued need to collect weapons or preserve evidence, and
reasonableness of delays.
In Preston v. State,69 the court suppressed evidence collected during a warrantless search that occurred two to three
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hours following the defendant’s arrest because the search was
not essentially contemporaneous.70 Upon arrest of the defendant,
officers transported the defendant’s car to a police garage before
it was searched, rather than searching the car in the parking
lot where the defendant was taken into custody.71 The detective
conducting the search stated that it was conducted in the police
garage because it was “just more convenient.”72 The court stated
that there was no doubt law enforcement could have conducted
the search in the parking lot and that by moving the car, they
made no attempt to satisfy reasonable promptness and thus created an undue delay.73 The court indicated that its decision may
have been different if the arrestee’s person or items immediately
associated with the arrestee’s person had been searched after
transportation to the police station, but they did not state with
certainty that a delay of two to three hours would be essentially
contemporaneous.74
In some instances, a search may be deemed contemporaneous to arrest even when it is not conducted at the scene or when
there is a delay, as long as that delay is reasonable. In Terrell
v. State,75 the court upheld as a search incident to arrest that
of a vehicle that had been towed to the police station.76 At the
scene of arrest it was dark and raining, the officers did not have
the proper means of illumination to search the vehicle, and the
station was less than a mile away.77 The court found that the
change in location and short delay was reasonable, considering
that there was no break in the chain of events and the search
was done with reasonable promptness immediately following
the arrest. 78
When an officer conducts a warrantless search of a cell
phone incident to a valid arrest, it must be done contemporaneous to that arrest. It must not be remote in time and place, and
there cannot be an unreasonable delay. Case law indicates that
if there is a logical reason for a small delay in time or change in
location, then the search will remain lawful. Officers must also
consider where the cell phone is retrieved from upon arrest. If
the cell phone is on the arrestee’s person or located in a purse or
backpack closely associated with the arrestee’s person, the officer may have more leeway as long as the warrantless search is
completed before the booking process is finished. On the other
hand, if the cell phone is found in luggage or in other containers
simply in possession of the arrestee, delays are more likely to
be deemed unreasonable.
The term “contemporaneous” is commonly thought to
mean “occurring or originating during the same time.” Courts
have stopped short of providing a bright line rule or fixed outer
limit of time that is deemed contemporaneous, so law enforcement officers must consider several factors when conducting the
warrantless search of a cell phone. They must consider where
the phone was found, how much time has elapsed between the
arrest and search, and whether the phone has been transported
to a new location. If more than a few minutes have elapsed or if
23

the phone has been transported, officers must consider whether
there was a good reason for these delays. If the delays could
not have been avoided and the search is conducted as soon as
possible, then it will likely be upheld as contemporaneous. If
the delay was simply created for the searching officer’s convenience, like in Preston v. State, the evidence gained from the
search will likely be suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Warrantless searches of cell phones are generally constitutional under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement. Contemporaneous to a lawful arrest, law enforcement officers are permitted to search call logs and text messages
for evidence that could potentially be destroyed before a search
warrant is obtained. Generally, a search will be considered contemporaneous if it is completed as soon as reasonably possible,
before the booking process is completed, and if it is not remote
in time and place. A search incident to arrest must be reasonable, and searches extending into further areas of the cell phone,
such as Internet browsing history, may exceed the scope of this
exception. As cellular technology continues to improve and as
cell phones begin to function more like computers, courts may
find that cell phones should be afforded greater privacy protections. To prevent the possible suppression of evidence, officers
should limit cell phone searches incident to arrest to call logs
and text messages when there is a fear that such evidence will
be destroyed. When possible officers should also ensure that the
search occurs within minutes of the arrest, and a search warrant
should be obtained whenever possible.
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